Setting the Record Straight:
A Sur-Reply to Professors Lawless et al.
†

Rafael I. Pardo

I. INTRODUCTION
I have recently engaged in a scholarly exchange with Professors
Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E.
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, and Elizabeth Warren regarding the conclusions they have drawn in their first report from the 2007 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project (the “First Report”).1 I wrote my critique in the spirit
of academically vigorous exchange with the hope of providing constructive commentary that would assist the First Report’s authors with their
ongoing project. I did not, and do not, intend the critique to be a personal attack, and I made every effort in writing the commentary to set
forth my arguments convincingly without being strident.
Unfortunately, the reply of Professors Lawless et al. to my critique
mischaracterizes, misinterprets, and does not fully engage with the constructive commentary that I suggested. In their conclusion, Professors
Lawless et al. write the following:
Professor Pardo has written some insightful and helpful pieces of
scholarship in the bankruptcy field that we have expressly relied
upon in our own individual research projects. This commentary, in
our opinion, is not one of them. Instead of offering useful ideas of
how to explore the available empirical data or build new data sets,
he impugns our methodology, our logical assumptions, and our very
understanding of BAPCPA’s means test. With respect for our col† Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University. For helpful suggestions, I am grateful to Lily
Kahng, Jonathan Nash, Charles O’Kelley, Nina Pardo, and David Skover.
1. See Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?]
(the First Report); Rafael I. Pardo, Failing to Answer Whether Bankruptcy Reform Failed: A Critique of the First Report from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 27
(2009); Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K.
Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Interpreting Data: A Reply to Professor Pardo, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 47
(2009) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Interpreting Data].
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league, we do not find these critiques grounded in either a compelling theory of the operation of the bankruptcy system or a thorough
understanding of our data.2

The manner in which the tone of the exchange has devolved is unfortunate, particularly because my goal has been for fruitful scholarly
exchange that will sharpen future analyses of the effects of BAPCPA by
motivating new research approaches.3 For this reason, I am writing a
sur-reply to clarify the misperceptions and mischaracterizations of my
commentary by Professors Lawless et al. and to demonstrate that my arguments not only are grounded in a compelling theory of the operation of
the bankruptcy system and an understanding of the First Report’s data,
but also offer useful ideas for exploring available empirical data.
This sur-reply will identify three of the main substantive points
made in my critique that Professors Lawless et al. misinterpret and/or
mischaracterize and will clarify why these original points are valid.
II. QUESTIONING THE ASSUMED INCOME PROFILE
OF THE 2007 NONFILING POPULATION
My critique of the First Report posits that one of the questionable
assumptions upon which the Report is based is the assumption that the
combined income profile of the 800,000 debtors who were deterred from
filing for bankruptcy in 2007 (the “2007 deterred population”) and those
who actually filed in 2007 (the “2007 filing population”) is similar to the
income profile of debtors who filed in 2001 (the “2001 filing population”).4 In reply, Professors Lawless et al. recast their assumption as one
of “assuming that the incomes of deterred filers are indistinguishable
from actual filers.”5 It is at this point that they misinterpret and mischaracterize one of the arguments that I offered to suggest that the assumption is questionable:
Does Professor Pardo offer any theories of his own regarding the
income of the excluded [i.e., the 2007 deterred population]—how
they might be higher . . . or lower . . . ? He does offer, in a footnote,
that some of the excluded filers might have been driven away by
higher attorney’s fees after BAPCPA. If we take that theory as cor2. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 60–61 (footnote omitted).
3. BAPCPA refers to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended primarily in numerous sections of 11 U.S.C.,
and secondarily in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), the most recent overhaul of the Bankruptcy
Code. I use the term “Bankruptcy Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532).
4. Pardo, supra note 1, at 31.
5. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 60.
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rect, and if we posit that those with lower incomes are the ones least
able to pay at the margin when attorney’s fees increase, then the income of the excluded 800,000 should be lower than the filing population. This would make our findings about the regressive impact of
BAPCPA even stronger. Thus, not only is Professor Pardo unable—as we are—to construct a hypothesis under which the income
of the excluded debtors would be higher in light of the available income data that we have, but his only speculation of the matter suggests that the income profiles of the excluded might be lower, which
buttresses our conclusions.6

Professors Lawless et al. misinterpret my argument. In suggesting
the theory that debtors deterred from filing in 2007 due to the increase in
attorneys’ fees (the “2007 fee-deterred population”) would “be lower
than that of the group of debtors deterred by the means test”7 (the “2007
means-test-deterred population”), I did not hypothesize about the extent
by which the income of the means-test-deterred population would exceed
that of the fee-deterred population. I did, however, argue that the exclusion of a group like the fee-deterred population from the 2007 deterred
population could alter the income distribution of the combined population of the 2007 deterred population and the 2007 filing population.8 The
following example suggests one possibility that undercuts the First Report’s conclusion.
The data from the First Report indicate that the average income of
bankruptcy filers was $30,743 in 2001 and $30,863 in 2007, a difference
that is statistically insignificant.9 Imagine that, in 2007, there were
200,000 fee-deterred debtors and that the annual income of each debtor
in that group was $18,200. Also imagine that, in 2007, there were
600,000 means-test-deterred debtors and that the annual income of each
debtor in that group was $35,000. Under these facts, the average income
for the 2007 deterred population is $30,800—virtually the same as the
2001 filing population. If, however, one excludes the fee-deterred debtors from the 2007 deterred population, the average income of the meanstest-deterred debtors is $35,000, a figure that is higher than the average
income of the 2007 filing population. Thus, here is one possibility where
the average incomes of the 2001 and 2007 filing populations are the
same, but where the average income of the subpopulation deterred by the
means test is higher than the 2007 filing population. Hopefully, this example (1) clarifies why I originally had doubts about their assumption
6. Id. (second emphasis added).
7. Pardo, supra note 1, at 31 n.21.
8. Id. at 31.
9. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 1, app. III at 404.

96

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:93

and (2) corrects the mischaracterization made by Professors Lawless et
al. that the assumption “is actually somewhat consistent with predictions
Professor Pardo himself makes elsewhere in his critique.”10
III. FRAMING THE APPROPRIATE RESEARCH QUESTION
Yet another ground on which I critique the First Report is the manner in which it framed its research question for answering whether
BAPCPA’s means test failed. I suggested in my commentary that “any
evaluation of whether the means test has been a success would, at a minimum, need to consider its effects on the filing population that it has targeted—specifically, by examining the dismissal and conversion of Chapter 7 cases under the abuse-dismissal framework.”11 Professors Lawless
et al. describe my critique as an accusation that they “misconceive the
true role and function of the means test and, as such, embark upon a
fool’s errand with [their] Report.”12 (Along the same lines, they state
that “[t]he thrust of Professor Pardo’s commentary, however, is his second point—that we simply ‘don’t get’ the means test.”13 It is disturbing
that they place the phrase “don’t get” in quotation marks. It suggests that
I used such language in my critique, which I did not.)
Nowhere in my critique do I suggest that it is not worthwhile to investigate the deterrent effect of the means test. To the contrary, I posit
that a comprehensive analysis of the means test does require an inquiry
into its deterrent effect.14 My criticism is that, by not considering the
operative effect of the means test (i.e., its effects as a mechanism for case
administration), the result is “an incomplete analysis of the effectiveness
of the means test.”15 Stating that the First Report’s analysis is incomplete is a far cry from suggesting that the Report constitutes a fool’s errand. In fact, it completely misrepresents my expressed belief that deterrence is a necessary component of any evaluation of the means test’s
success (as is the test’s operative effect). If one is going to make sweeping conclusions such as “BAPCPA’s much-touted means test was a failure,”16 then one must explore the test’s efficacy in all relevant regards,
including the test’s operative effect.

10. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 47–48 (citing Pardo, supra note 1, at 30
n.21).
11. Pardo, supra note 1, at 33–34.
12. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 48.
13. Id.
14. Pardo, supra note 1, at 34 n.31.
15. Id. at 32.
16. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 1, at 363.
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Professors Lawless et al., however, dismiss my suggestion of exploring the means test’s operative effect, suggesting that it is an invalid
research question:
We hold to our understanding of the means test and the concomitant
research questions it generates. With respect, Professor Pardo’s alternative strikes us as naïve because it assumes that all debtors (and
their lawyers) simply file their cases and then wait to see if they
pass the means test. We think nothing of the sort occurs. Rather,
debtors who know they will flunk the means test simply are advised
not to file—and do not file—in chapter 7. It is whimsical to suggest
that they do file, presumably checking the box to indicate that they
flunk the means test, and then wait for their dismissal (perhaps hoping they’ll slip through the cracks?).17

Professors Lawless et al. misstate my critique. Nowhere do I argue
that lawyers and their clients blindly file for Chapter 7 relief hoping that
the means test will work out in their favor. Quite the opposite, I expressly state that debtor attorneys will counsel their clients not to file for
bankruptcy in those instances where the clients would be deemed ineligible for Chapter 7 relief on the basis of abuse (whether via the means test
or otherwise).18
An inquiry into the operative effect of the means test is a worthwhile research question because of the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity in applying the means test,19 a point that I raised in my critique.20
Because of this uncertainty and ambiguity, it is reasonable to conclude
that many attorneys and their debtor clients will file for Chapter 7 relief
with the good-faith belief that they do not run afoul of the means test but
may nonetheless end up facing a dismissal motion due to a different expectation of outcome by the moving party. Herein lies the significance
of studying the operative effect of the means test. BAPCPA’s means test
marked a transition away from a standard-based to a rule-based approach
for defining abuse of the bankruptcy system. But as I have observed
elsewhere, a great deal of judicial discretion persists under this rule-

17. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 49.
18. Pardo, supra note 1, at 35 (“[B]y virtue of the shadow of the law, an attorney who advises
an individual considering filing for bankruptcy will surely consider the effect that the means test
could have on his or her client’s eligibility for Chapter 7 relief—if not because the attorney looks out
for the client’s best interest, then because of BAPCPA’s provision that the signature of an attorney
on a petition constitutes a certification that the attorney determined that the petition does not constitute an abuse of Chapter 7.”).
19. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 482–84 (2007).
20. See Pardo, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Pardo, supra note 19, at 482–84).
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based approach.21 One might ask, therefore, whether the means test has
effectively curbed the “great deal of variance [that] characterized courts’
assessment of the level of surplus future income that would trigger a
finding of substantial abuse,”22 the pre-BAPCPA standard for dismissing
a case on the basis of abuse of the bankruptcy system.23
Interestingly, Professors Lawless et al. refer to the inherent uncertainty in application of the means test to refute my point that “[h]ighincome debtors need not worry about the means test provided that they
have a level of disposable income that is insufficient to trigger the presumption of abuse under the means test.”24 They state that “[t]he means
test gauntlet subjects debtors to pervasive judicial and creditor scrutiny
and opens the door to objections whose resolutions can render a debtor
ineligible for chapter 7.”25 They conclude: “Suffice it to say our sense of
realism under the means test differs from his; perhaps he has a stronger
belief in the legal clarity of BAPCPA’s deductions, the ease with which
the expenses can be calculated and verified, or the fortitude of debtor
nerves.”26
Yet again, here is a mischaracterization that requires correction. As
already stated, I believe interpretation of the means test to be fraught
with uncertainty.27 The example I gave merely contemplated a situation
where the debtor would know that he or she passes the means test because of low disposable income and would therefore not have to worry
about ineligibility for Chapter 7 relief on the basis of the means test’s
presumption of abuse. Nowhere did my statement indicate how the debtor would arrive at the low disposable-income figure. Professors Lawless et al. assumed that I envisioned an easy case of passing the means
test on the basis of expense deductions allowed under the means test.28
But this is not at all what I had in mind. There are scenarios that are
much more clear cut. For example, an above-median income debtor owing a high amount of priority tax debt may pass the means test if the
monthly payments on such debt exceeded his or her current monthly in21. Pardo, supra note 19, at 479–86.
22. Id. at 477.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2005).
24. Pardo, supra note 1, at 41.
25. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 54.
26. Id. at 55. It should be noted that Professors Lawless et al. appeared to have a strong belief
in the legal clarity of BAPCPA when they set out to conduct their empirical study. See Lawless et
al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 1, at 354 (“The decision to study debtors who filed for
bankruptcy in 2007 was a difficult one. By that date, enough time had plausibly elapsed after the
October 1, 2005 effective date of BAPCPA so that the enforcement of the new law had reached a
normal state.”). My critique questioned this assumption. See Pardo, supra note 1, at 43 n.69.
27. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
28. See Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 54–55.
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come.29 Surely there are situations where the amount of priority tax debt
owed by the debtor would not be disputed by any party such that the debtor could be confident about passing the means test.30
In any event, in the same way it is reasonable for Professors Lawless et al. to envision a scenario where “debtors who know they will
flunk the means test”31 will not file for Chapter 7 relief, so too is it reasonable for me to have envisioned a scenario where the debtor knows he
passes the means test. These are the cases at the extremes. In the middle
are the cases with uncertainty where some debtors will file believing that
chances are more likely than not that they have passed the means test.
While an abuse dismissal may materialize, it may nonetheless be worthwhile for the debtor to file given the reward of a discharge that awaits if
the debtor survives the motion (if brought). Again, it is in these cases
where we ought to care about the means test’s operative effect.
Despite conceding in their reply the inherent uncertainty in the application of the means test, Professors Lawless et al. dismiss my suggestion to study the operative effect of the means test by analogizing to their
hypothetical “‘Litigation Masculinization Reform Act’ [LMRA] that requires any civil complaint filed by a female plaintiff to be dismissed.”32
Through this hypothetical analogy, they impute to me the approach they
think I would take to researching the effects of the LMRA and attempt to
portray me in an unfavorable light as someone who would pursue inappropriate research questions. Their simplistic analogy, however, merely
serves to reinforce my original point: Professors Lawless et al. “could
have delineated the manner in which BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy
Code and how those statutory changes would be expected to affect a debtor’s evaluation of his or her choices in considering (1) whether to file
for bankruptcy and (2) the chapter of relief under which the debtor would
file.”33
The LMRA analogy is inapt because it involves a single bright-line
rule that considerably reduces discretion (albeit not completely).34 In
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (setting forth the means test); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv)
(providing rule for calculating monthly payment of priority claims); id. § 507(a)(8) (setting forth tax
claims entitled to priority).
30. Similarly, one could imagine a scenario where a debtor’s monthly secured debt payments
are sufficiently high to negate a debtor’s current monthly income, thus eliminating the possibility of
the presumption of abuse arising under the means test. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (providing rule for
calculating average monthly payments of secured debts).
31. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 49.
32. Id. at 50.
33. Pardo, supra note 1, at 34.
34. What result when a complaint is filed by a female plaintiff on behalf of a male plaintiff, or
vice versa? What result when a complaint is filed by a male plaintiff who subsequently undergoes a
transgender operation before the litigation has concluded? And so on and so forth.
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stark contrast, the means test (a rule) is part of a broader statutory
framework to evaluate whether a Chapter 7 filing by an individual debtor
can be dismissed on the basis of abuse (a standard). The means-test presumption of abuse can be rebutted by showing “special circumstances”35
(a standard). Thus, above-median debtors who initially flunk the means
test may be able to stay in the system by rebutting the presumption. In
cases where the presumption of abuse does not arise or is rebutted, the
court must consider whether “the totality of the circumstances . . . of the
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse”36 (a standard). Thus,
below-median debtors who are not subject to the means test may nonetheless be kicked out of the system. The precursor to this framework for
analyzing abuse of the bankruptcy system by Chapter 7 debtors was
“substantial abuse”37 (a standard), a term which the Bankruptcy Code did
not define. Thus, part of the legislative push for the framework shift was
eliminating judicial discretion over these sorts of questions. But, as already noted, discretion abounds. And so, operative effect matters.38
IV. TOTAL INCOME OR DISPOSABLE INCOME?
Finally, one of the major points on which I critique the First Report
is its use of a debtor’s total income (or gross income)39 as a metric for
testing the deterrent effect of the means test. I argue that the metric is
inappropriate because the means test focuses on disposable income rather

35. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B).
36. Id. § 707(b)(3)(B).
37. Id. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2005).
38. Professors Lawless et al., however, remain unconvinced: “[R]ather than apologize for our
purportedly ‘un-nuanced’ understanding of the means test, we stand by it. We think we accurately
comprehend what the years of legislative squabbling were all about and were consequently correct to
focus on deterrence in framing our research questions.” Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note
1, at 50.
39. Whereas I use the phrase “total income” in my critique, see Pardo, supra note 1, at 41–43,
Professors Lawless et al. use the phrase gross income, see Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra
note 1, at 53-57. As I note in my critique, the First Report does not specify the source from which
the income data were derived, and I assume, for reasons explained in my critique, that those data
were obtained from Official Form 6I (“Schedule I—Current Income of Individual Debtor(s)”), see
11 U.S.C. app. at 458 (2006). See Pardo, supra note 1, at 41. I avoid using the phrase “gross income” since the first item on Schedule I requires the debtor to list “[m]onthly gross wages, salary,
and commissions.” Official Form 6I, 11 U.S.C. app. at 458 (2006). Schedule I then allows a debtor
to deduct payroll taxes, among other things, from his or her monthly gross wages. See id. My assumption that the First Report’s income data were derived from Schedule I includes the assumption
that the information recorded from Schedule I was the debtor’s “average monthly income,” which
takes into account the deductions from gross wages. See id. Accordingly, I use the phrase “total
income” to refer to a debtor’s “average monthly income” as reported on Schedule I (and assume that
Professors Lawless et al. use the phrase “gross income” to refer to the same).

2009]

Setting the Record Straight

101

than total income. Professors Lawless et al. defend their decision “on
both normative and methodological grounds.”40
Professors Lawless et al. normatively justify using total income
based on their view that “[t]he means test has two parts: the gross income
screen and the disposable income screen.”41 Respectfully, I disagree that
the total-income screen is a component of the means test. It is a limitation on standing to bring an abuse dismissal motion based on the means
test.42 But the screen itself does not test the means of the debtor to repay
past debts from future income.43 The statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code supports this view. When Code §707(b)(2)(D) refers to
“means testing,”44 it clearly is not referring to Code § 707(b)(7)(A), the
total-income screen that limits standing to bring an abuse dismissal motion predicated on the means test.
If one takes an expansive view that the total-income screen is part
of the means test, then why not consider all of the means test, including
the mathematical formula that determines whether a debtor has sufficient
disposable income to trigger the presumption of abuse,45 as well as the
provision that would allow a debtor to rebut the presumption by demonstrating special circumstances?46 If Professors Lawless et al. insist on
making the sweeping conclusion that “BAPCPA’s much-touted means
test was a failure,”47 then it seems only reasonable that their analyses
should address how all aspects of the means test (particularly the test
itself) could shape its deterrent effect, and thus the income profile of the
filing population.
Professors Lawless et al. also justify on methodological grounds
their use of total income to test the deterrent effect of the means test. In
doing so, they reject my suggestion to use a variable for disposable income calculated as the difference between the debtor’s income (derived
from Schedule I) and expenses (derived from Schedule J):
40. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 54.
41. Id.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A) (2006) (stating that “[n]o judge, United States trustee (or
bankruptcy administrator, if any), trustee, or other party in interest may file a motion under paragraph (2)” with respect to a debtor whose annual income is less than or equal to the state median
income for a family size comparable to that of the debtor’s household).
43. Debtors who are not subject to means testing may still be scrutinized for income-based
repayment ability, see id. § 707(b)(3)(B), a point raised in my critique, see Pardo, supra note 1, at
44–45, 45 n.74.
44. Id. § 707(b)(2)(D) (“Subparagraphs (A) through (C) shall not apply, and the court may not
dismiss or convert a case based on any form of means testing . . . if the debtor is a disabled veteran . . . and the indebtedness occurred primarily during a period during which he or she was . . . on
active duty . . . or . . . performing a homeland defense activity . . . .” (emphasis added)).
45. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
46. See id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
47. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 1, at 363.
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The problem, however, with this idea is endogeneity. Here is the
conundrum: if a researcher attempts to work out people’s food expenses, car expenses, secured debt, etc., per the means test standards
by plucking numbers from Schedule Js in the 2001 cases, it will be
necessary to assume that if those people had filed under a BAPCPA
regime their reported expenses would have been identical. But we
cannot know that. . . . A synthetic means-test “disposable income”
variable constructed from 2001 cases cannot tell us reliably how
those same debtors would have reported (and even incurred) expenses in 2007. This challenge brings us to an important point regarding the conduct of empirical research: investigators must make
judgment calls based on logical inference and common sense.
Guided by caution, we concluded that we could not be safe in constructing 2001 hypothetical means-test disposable income and so
empirical prudence required staying with the more objective and
consistent gross income measure.48

My efforts in the critique to assuage endogeneity concerns regarding a disposable-income construct were summarily dismissed by Professors Lawless et al. without engaging the substance of my analysis.49 I
still stand by that analysis. That said, let us assume for the sake of argument that Professors Lawless et al. are correct that the endogeneity concerns they identify cannot be explained away. If they are correct, then
the data they offer to support their conclusion regarding the means test’s
failure suffer from the same endogeneity concerns they raise regarding
my disposable-income construct.
Presumably, the income data set forth in the First Report are derived from Schedule I.50 Under the abuse dismissal framework, income
has taken on added significance post-BAPCPA. Income is the basis for
both (1) the total-income screen that limits standing to bring an abuse
dismissal motion based on the means test and (2) the starting point of the
means-test equation for determining whether a debtor has sufficient disposable income to trigger the presumption of abuse. By the logic offered
by Professors Lawless et al., the comparison of the income profiles of the
2001 and 2007 debtors requires us to assume that the income figures reported by the 2001 debtors in their schedules would have been identical
to the figures they would have reported in their schedules had they filed
in 2007. If, according to Professors Lawless et al., it would not be sound
48. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 55–56 (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 56 n.48 (“Professor Pardo . . . confronts the potential concern of endogeneity in
the third paragraph of a multi-paged footnote. . . . We refer interested readers to that lengthy discussion if so inclined; suffice it to say we are less sanguine than Professor Pardo at dismissing the endogeneity issue presented.” (citation omitted)).
50. See supra note 39.
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to make such an assumption with respect to Schedule J expenses, why is
it sound to make the assumption with respect to Schedule I income? Professors Lawless et al. offer no justification and simply conclude that
“empirical prudence required staying with the more objective and consistent gross income measure.”51
Added concern arises from the fact that the total-income screen and
the means test center on the concept of “current monthly income,” which
the Bankruptcy Code defines as the average monthly income that the
debtor receives from all sources during one of two possible historical sixmonth periods.52 As I pointed out in my critique, “[t]he fact that ‘current
monthly income’ is based on an historical average raises the possibility
that ‘current monthly income’ could either be higher or lower than the
debtor’s actual monthly income at the time he or she files for bankruptcy,
depending on whether the debtor experienced income fluctuations prior
to filing.”53 Nowhere in the First Report do Professors Lawless et al.
explain why, for purposes of evaluating the deterrent effect of the means
test, it is appropriate to marshal Schedule I income data when debtors
would rely on the “current monthly income” that would be reported in
Official Form B22A (“Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income
and Means-Test Calculation”)54 to ascertain eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.
V. CONCLUSION
In writing this sur-reply, my intent has been to clarify mischaracterizations and misconceptions of the arguments set forth in my critique
of the First Report. I certainly agree with Professors Lawless et al. that
we must all move on to more productive ventures.55 Hopefully, the clarifications set forth here will facilitate this.

51. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 55–56.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2006).
53. Pardo, supra note 1, at 36.
54. See 11 U.S.C. app. at 533.
55. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 61.

